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“Nonsense criticism, as it currently exists,” writes Josephine 
Gabelman in her new book A Theology of Nonsense (2016), “is essentially a 
secular enterprise. It is philosophical and psychoanalytical, philological and 
mathematical; it may be studied from a historical or cultural perspective, but 
apparently not a religious one” (162). Past scholarship has, in fact, not only 
avoided a serious consideration of theology regarding nonsense literature, 
but some scholars have gone so far as to insist that nonsense literature lacks 
any sense of the religious at all. Jean-Jacques Lecercle, when considering 
freedom in Alice in Wonderland, argues that nonsense grants her freedom 
from religiousness and, consequently, from “the stern God of Protestant 
extremism” (369), and, therefore, provides a means of escape from religion. 
Robert Polhemus similarly argues that considering theology in context with 
Carrollian nonsense would be inappropriate. Concerning the nonsense in 
Through the Looking-Glass, Polhemus writes, “The structure of the game 
and the plot, as well as the thought and humor of the book, reveal . . . Carroll 
winning out over the Reverend Mr. Dodgson, and a comic regression and 
reversal winning out over orthodox religion” (292). These approaches, where 
they have not been generally accepted, have at least gone unchallenged until 
recently. In A Theology of Nonsense, Gabelman explores the connections 
between nonsense literature and theology by challenging the arguments of 
Lecercle, Polhemus, and others by reevaluating theology’s role as an essential 
component in understanding nonsense literature.1
Gabelman relies on Sir Edward Strachey’s essay “Nonsense as a 
Fine Art” (1888), the first serious study of nonsense literature, to establish 
how literary nonsense was understood as a theological process of reversal 
and disorder that ultimately results in the reunification of reality into a 
higher order. Strachey writes that nonsense is “not a mere putting forward of 
incongruities and absurdities but the bringing out a new and deeper harmony 
of life in and through its contradictions” (515). This process of bringing 
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“confusion into order by setting things upside down” not only reflects the 
aims of Christian orthodoxy, as Gabelman observes, but necessarily evokes 
the Romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s imagination introduced as a 
synthetic power that “dissolves, dissipates in order to recreate” and “struggles 
to idealize and unify” (Coleridge 118). I shall also argue that the confusion, 
which Gabelman argues is necessary in bringing about the higher order, 
is also reflected in the writings of the German Romantic poet Novalis (the 
pen name of Friedrich von Hardenberg), whose ideas about fairy tales were 
translated and introduced to England by George MacDonald. 
Gabelman’s argument confronts nonsense literature as “an 
inversion of the sensible,” instead of nonsense functioning as an “absence 
of its destruction” (168). Beginning with this approach, she establishes 
the theological context of the “nonsensical imagination” as dealing with 
“paradox, anarchy, and the childlike, all which in their own way reverse 
common-sense assumptions” (168). Gabelman draws from G.K. Chesterton 
to establish the fall of humanity in Christian theology as a reversal of sense. 
Chesterton states that the paradoxical position taken by Christianity can 
be seen in its claim that “the ordinary condition of man is not his sane or 
sensible condition; that the normal itself is an abnormality. This is the inmost 
philosophy of the fall.” (191-2). Christianity, as Gabelman observes, “seems 
destined to defy common sense” (169) and aims to restore the sense through 
a process of paradox, anarchy, and chaos towards an eventual reunification, a 
resolution which J.R.R. Tolkien would later describe as the “eucatastrophe,” 
the satisfactory feeling of resolution and a deeper insight into Truth about the 
world.2  
Furthering this assertion that the aims of nonsense literature are 
shared by and deeply connected to Christian theology, my argument seeks 
to examine George MacDonald’s The Princess and the Goblin and Lewis 
Carroll’s Alice stories as texts whose literary nonsense operates in accordance 
with the aims of Christian theology, namely, to bring out “a new and deeper 
harmony of life” (Strachey 515). The scope of Gabelman’s study is restricted 
to institutional theology, and she neglects consideration of the Romantics and 
their theology. This article will extend Gabelman’s argument by recognizing 
nonsense literature’s indebtedness to the Romantic theology of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge and Novalis. Thus, the literary nonsense of MacDonald and Carroll 
specifically relies on a theology distilled by their Romantic predecessors, 
particularly the Romantic understanding of the imagination and anarchy. I 
will also consider how the readers’ engagement with the nonsense literature 
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of MacDonald and Carroll requires a proper epistemological approach to 
understanding reality by normalizing the abnormal.   
Objects of Nonsense in MacDonald’s and Carroll’s Texts
This section will address the use of symbols, namely the fire-opal 
in MacDonald’s The Princess and the Goblin and the looking-glass in 
Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass and their indebtedness to Coleridge’s 
imagination. Both texts use what I will call “objects of nonsense” to convey 
truth and how truth is understood theologically through Romantic intuition. 
This use of nonsense is reflected in the Chestertonian notion of Christian 
sense, as we have seen, as “the unnaturalness of everything in light of the 
supernatural” (145). Gabelman insists that these inversions of the natural 
within nonsense literature introduce “a post-edenic, unnatural topsy-
turvydom,” and, “in such a context, to speak of that which is ‘natural’ or ‘the 
right way up,’ it may thus be necessary to speak nonsensically” (174). Basing 
her idea of reversal on the theological notion of restoration, Gabelman relates 
Strachey’s observations on nonsense literature, that it “bring[s] confusion 
into order by sitting things upside down,” to the euchatastrophic elements 
of the Christian story through the death and resurrection of Christ. Let us 
apply this observation to MacDonald’s The Princess and the Goblin to better 
understand the role of the imagination through theological imagery.
The imagery of Grandmother Irene’s gifts, such as the fire-opal ring 
and the thread, function as simulacra for Romantic intuition and Christian 
understanding of the paraclete (the Holy Spirit), neither exclusively 
symbolic nor entirely allegorical, but as interconnecting parts within the 
living organism of the fairy tale. I will soon return to the significance of 
the paraclete in MacDonald’s works. Irene’s guiding thread, which Irene 
can feel only forwards, never backwards, is spun by her grandmother and 
is characterized by its indescribability. In Chapter III, when Irene discovers 
her great-great-grandmother living at the top of the castle by wandering up 
hidden staircases and passageways, she is led to her chamber by the “low 
sweet humming sound” of her grandmother’s spinning wheel (20). The 
humming of the wheel is almost undetectable “stopping” and “beginning 
again,” yet difficult for the author to describe. MacDonald portrays it as 
“curious,” “more gentle, even monotonous like the sound of rain,” and “like 
the hum of a very happy bee that had found a rich well of honey in some 
globular flower” (20). Recognizing the limitations of similes, the narrator 
settles on this description, deciding that it is more like the humming of a 
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bee “than anything else I can think of at the moment” (20). This ineffable 
element lends a supernatural or supersensual meaning to the string and invites 
spiritual interpretation of its symbolism.
The voice of the narrator and Irene’s grandmother both insist Irene 
guess or intuit what the grandmother is spinning. We are introduced to the 
spinning wheel early in the story, but neither Irene nor the readers learn 
what she is spinning until much later. At the end of Chapter III, we are told 
that we must “guess” what she is spinning (30). In Chapter XI, when Irene 
returns to her grandmother’s room, she finds her spinning again, and she 
urges the princess to tell her what she is spinning. Irene replies, “I don’t 
know what you are spinning. Please, I thought you were a dream” (114). 
Again, the grandmother insists, “You haven’t told me what I am spinning” 
(116). This insistence, in part, is meant to engage the reader in an active 
participation with the story, as well as to emphasize the importance of Irene’s 
self-knowledge, or to awaken within her what Coleridge described as “the 
sacred power of self-intuition,” the essential faculty of the “philosophic 
imagination” (Coleridge 241-2). MacDonald would extend this further by 
connecting it with the “listening” to what he calls the “voice of the Spirit” 
(Unspoken Sermons 57).
For MacDonald, the imagination functions primarily as a means 
through which one can intuit the meaning behind the sacramental nature of 
creation and is strongly connected to his pneumatology, the understanding 
of the Holy Spirit as the indwelling and guiding member of the Trinity. 
Curiously, the paraclete in the Christian tradition is associated with nonsense 
and madness. The word paraclete comes from the Greek parakletos, which 
is translated in the Protestant Bible as “Counselor,” “Guide,” “Advocate” 
(See Isaiah 11:2; John 14:16, 15:26). The descending of the Holy Spirit upon 
Jesus’s followers occurred on the Day of Pentecost and was given as a kind 
of token for guidance. It also enabled them to speak in various languages 
(Acts 2:8). Some, when they heard them, were filled with wonder while 
others believed they spoke nonsense or were drunk (Acts 2:13). 
In his essay “The Imagination: Its Functions and its Culture” 
MacDonald imagines how “God sits in that chamber of our being in which 
the candle of our consciousness goes out in darkness, and sends forth 
from thence wonderful gifts into the light of that understanding which is 
His candle” (Dish of Orts 25). MacDonald scholars have established how 
the archetypal wise-woman or the grandmother of MacDonald’s stories is 
inspired by embodiment of Divine Sophia found in Kabbalah, Jakob Boehme, 
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and Novalis (Hayward 29), and, if we are to take the grandmother as a 
sophianic or, perhaps even a theophanic figure, the ring and the thread take 
on new theological significance. 
In light of MacDonald’s acknowledgement of the philosophical 
imagination, we may then come to see Irene’s thread, which leads her 
through the world back to her grandmother, as a symbol for the relational 
imagination of humankind, which is nonsensical in its mode of operation. 
The ring’s stone, a fire-opal, which is “of the same sort” as the stones in her 
grandmother’s crown, “only not so good” and its circuitous thread not only 
present intuition as a human faculty derivative of God, but as a symbol for 
understanding through relational intuition beyond empirical stimulus (153). 
The thread, which the princess would follow into the door of the mountain, 
leads her to rescue Curdie and guides her back to its source. In this way, it 
represents MacDonald’s own understanding of the imagination’s circuitous 
and intuitive faculty. When read in context with the idea of reversal outlined 
by Gabelman, we can see how the fire opal ring and its thread are objects of 
nonsense, bringing about the great reversal necessary to correctly reset our 
rational sense.
There is a similar object in Carroll’s sequel to Alice in Wonderland 
which resembles the fire opal ring and thread in both its circuity and its 
role in providing the reversal. Gabelman identifies this within Carroll as 
the looking glass itself, the portal to the other world. Concerning the great 
reversal, Gabelman observes that “whereas literary nonsense is . . . a 180 
degree turn about, within salvation history there is a double reversal at 
work—a 360 turn, in two halves. In other words, the fall makes things the 
wrong way round and salvation flips them back the right way” (176). She 
likens this turn around to “the visual paradox of the mirror, where the image 
in the glass is not an identical representation but the reversal of the original 
perspective” (176). For the purposes of Gablman’s argument, this is as far as 
she takes this connection, but I would like to pursue this comparison further 
in connection with Coleridge’s Romantic function of the symbol of the 
mirror. 
The Romantic understanding of poetry, or the effect upon the mind 
that poetry should ideally produce, should first be understood in relation to 
its Enlightenment predecessors. Coleridge’s definition of the imagination in 
his Biographia Literaria rejects John Locke’s understanding of the mind as 
a tabula rasa, a blank slate upon which experience impresses, though we find 
the empiricist view extending back to classical thought, as seen in Plato’s 
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Theaetetus and Aristotle’s De Anima. Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding” describes the mind, not unlike a mirror, as a “white paper 
void of all characters, without any ideas,” a passive slate void of agency or 
a priori knowledge until acted upon by the external world. Coleridge took 
issue with Locke’s static conception of the mind and actually attributed 
the decline in English philosophy and theology to the popularity of such 
Enlightenment modes of thinking. Under Locke’s view, the imagination can 
only be produced by a synthesis of what the individual has already seen and 
experienced. 
However, Coleridge’s use of the mirror in describing poetry is not 
resigned to static conceptions of the mind but, instead, relies heavily upon the 
Platonic notion of mimesis and uses the mirror as an object used to transform 
reality. In opposition to Locke’s use of the mirror, which fixes the objects 
within its frame as a kind of fossilization, the Romantics used the mirror as 
an object which makes things come alive and represents an energetic, living 
world. William Wordsworth, too, would play with the symbols laden in the 
reflective and dynamic properties of the mirror. In his Prelude, he describes 
“a new world” governed by laws: 
Which do both give it being and maintain
A balance, an ennobling interchange
Of action from without and from within;
The excellence, pure function, and best power
Both of the object seen, and eye that sees. (Wordsworth 589)
Coleridge would employ the use of other objects, such as lamps, streams, 
and growing plants to describe the living perceptions of the mind. Victorian 
authors sustained the Romantic flexibility concerning aesthetic symbols and 
their functions. Carroll took the mirror-object even further in Through the 
Looking-Glass by using the looking-glass as an agent of transformation.
In addition to the reversed representation of the world in the mirror, 
the mirror serves the purpose of re-inventing the external world by restoring 
not only the sense of wonder but the sense of beauty. Alice’s experience 
of beauty in the looking-glass world is one that restores into proper place 
our relation to nature, namely its unattainability. “Why are all reflections 
lovelier than what we call reality?” MacDonald muses, “not so grand or so 
strong, it may be, but always lovelier? . . . All mirrors are magic mirrors. The 
commonest room is a room in a poem when I turn to the glass . . . There must 
be a truth involved in it, though we may but in part lay hold of the meaning” 
(Phantastes 155). Similarly, through a nonsensical inversion, Carroll’s 
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looking-glass romanticizes and elicits a desire to see more: “Oh! I so wish I 
could see that bit!” and “Oh, Kitty, how nice it would be if we could only get 
through into the Looking-glass House! I’m sure it’s got, oh! such beautiful 
things in it!” (108-9). The barrier of the looking-glass soon dissolves away 
in the same way Coleridge describes the imagination’s power to “dissolve 
and dissipate in order to recreate” (BL I 118). This necessary process of 
dissolution and dissipation in order to bring about a harmonious whole will 
be examined further in the next section in terms of Novalis’s understanding 
of anarchy. The importance of such objects is to reflect the “modes of inmost 
being” that cannot be conveyed “save in symbols of time and space” (BL 
II 120). However, the looking-glass, for Carroll, is something more than a 
portal. The title “Into the Looking-Glass” would have been more apposite, 
were the looking-glass only an access point. The choice of the preposition 
“through” bequeaths deeper meaning as the story unfolds. We find that the 
looking-glass is not only a door, but also a world of its own. The Romantic 
conception of poetic process, which is endowed with the theological function 
of allowing common things to be seen in proper light as new or enchanting, is 
correlative to the object of the looking-glass and Alice’s journey through the 
looking-glass, which transforms and enchants common places and objects. 
Once within the world of the looking-glass, this enchantment acts 
upon common objects through beauty. From a theological viewpoint, beauty 
serves as a reminder for something beyond our world to apprehending an 
end, rather than an end to be apprehended as a thing in itself. Beauty invokes 
the longing for and recognition of something beyond our world.3 The objects 
of the bulrushes in Chapter V of Through the Looking-Glass operate as a 
correlative to unattainable beauty in the objects of the bulrushes. Carroll, 
too, seems to toy with this idea of unattainability in the chapter “Wool and 
Water,” in which Alice drifts along a stream in a little boat. Carroll writes, 
“—and for a while Alice forgot all about the Sheep and the knitting, as she 
bent over the side of the boat, with just the ends of her tangled hair dripping 
into the water—while with bright eager eyes she caught at one bunch after 
another of the darling scented rushes” (154).
The nonsensical world within the looking-glass acts as a signpost 
toward the true world beyond reach. Similarly, the beauty of the bulrushes in 
the looking-glass world invokes a similar response in Alice: 
“Oh, what a lovely one! Only I couldn’t quite reach it.” And certainly 
it did seem a little provoking (“almost as if it happened on purpose,” 
she thought) that, though she managed to pick plenty of beautiful 
17   Walker
rushes as the boat glided by, there was always a more lovely one that 
she couldn’t reach.
“The prettiest are always further!” she said at last . . . (154)
Beauty is alluding, hinting at something beyond our reach. Beauty resists 
apprehension, and, eventually, the bulrushes themselves, shortly after being 
grasped, disappear:
What mattered it to her just then that the rushes had begun to fade, 
and to lose all their scent and beauty, from the very moment that she 
picked them? Even real scented rushes, you know, last only a very 
little while—and these, being dream-rushes, melted away almost like 
snow, as they lay in heaps at her feet . . . (154)
It seems nonsense that the bulrushes should disappear. We may wonder 
why Carroll writes this bizarre scene into his story at all. Perhaps this 
scene is rather arbitrary, though lovely, and only emphasizes the dream-like 
transitions between passages. However, let us entertain a potential theological 
implication of the disappearance of the bulrushes. In his own way, it seems 
Carroll is portraying a theological understanding of beauty that was reiterated 
by St. Augustine, who believed that the loveliness of the world was meant to 
incite a hunger for divine beauty, but not to satisfy it.4 Alice’s apprehension 
of the bulrushes as things to be gathered and picked does not satisfy her 
desire for beauty, but only frustrates and enhances it. The mirror does not 
restore the world back into its pre-fallen, Edenic state, but, rather, awakens 
within a desire for the state, which, according to Christian theology, is not in 
this world, but the next. In this reading, the disappearance of the bulrushes 
is analogous to the experience of beauty in this world. Though Carroll notes 
their similarity to “real scented rushes” (which “last only a little while”), the 
dream bulrushes and their nonsensical disappearance reflect outwardly the 
more inward and immediate truth about experiencing beauty (154). 
By examining how this nonsensical function of the mirror creates an 
inversion and reversal by means of reconnecting with distorted truth through 
fallen nature, we have seen how wonder, inspired by the normalization of the 
supernatural, is couched in the aims of theology to subvert the fallen mode 
of thinking. The anastrophic use of the imagination, derivative of Coleridge’s 
theologically philosophical imagination, renders the encounters with other 
worlds (Wonderland, Fairy, etc.) as an experience aimed towards correcting 
the upside-down understanding of conventional rationality.
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Nonsensical Anarchy and Restoration
Concerning the role of anarchy, or the sense of rebellion and 
lawlessness that is essential to nonsense literature, Polhemus argues that the 
overarching law of Carroll’s worlds requires one to “consider things from the 
very opposite of the conventional point of view.”5 Gabelman also devotes a 
chapter to the role of anarchy in nonsense literature, particularly regarding 
its parallels within Christian theology. Gabelman observes that “Carroll’s 
stories require the reader to enter into an enchanted world, whose narrative 
authority is recurrently disrupted” (94). She posits that nonsense literature 
and anarchy intersect with religious faith through “the participant’s capacity 
to think in terms that contradict a secular interpretation of the familiar world” 
(129). Conceding this correlation, this section will explore how the role 
of anarchy in nonsense literature is an idea distilled, once again, through a 
Romantic theological approach found in the writings of Novalis, who was 
first introduced into the context of fantasy writing by George MacDonald. 
Concerning the anarchic subversion of reason in Alice’s case, 
as Gabelman aptly observes, “it is not that she encounters an absence of 
authority figures, but rather that she finds those in the possession of power 
frequently have their authority undercut, mocked or deconstructed” (93). 
But let us examine anarchy’s role in the nonsensical as a necessary step in 
achieving greater harmony. MacDonald explicitly relies on Novalis’s idea 
of anarchy and its role in the fairy tale, or Märchen. MacDonald’s citing of 
this passage, first published as an epigraph to Phantastes (1858), was the first 
text to introduce Novalis’s Romantic conception of the fairy tale to Victorian 
England. An excerpt from Novalis’s passage reads as follows:
A Märchen is like a dream-picture without rational connection— 
an ensemble of wonderful objects and happenings, for example a 
musical fantasy, the harmony of an aeolian harp, nature itself.
In a true Märchen all must be wonderful, mysterious and coherent; 
everything crowded, each in a different way. All of nature must be 
wonderfully mixed with all of the spirit world; here enters the time 
of anarchy, of lawlessness, freedom, the natural state of nature, the 
time before the world . . . The world of the Märchen is that which 
is opposed to the world of truth, and thus is like it as chaos is like 
completed creation. (Phantastes 12) [my translation]. 
Novalis’s advocacy for a “dream-picture without rational connection” in 
which anarchy, freedom, and lawlessness reign is an adumbration which 
stems from his larger ideas about anarchy’s role within Christian cosmology 
19   Walker
and corresponds with MacDonald’s and Carroll’s literary nonsense.  
Let me first consider the role of anarchy as a subversion of authority 
before examining it as a sense of lawlessness. In his sermon “Truth,” 
MacDonald elaborates upon the relational distinction between truth and fact. 
According to MacDonald, knowledge of facts is understood through the 
“laws of nature,” through science and empirical observation (461); truth is the 
understanding of God’s nature and is, opposed to objective facts, relational. 
To understand the facts of a thing is the way of science, but the understanding 
of the thing itself comes through the intuitive faculty of the imagination, 
which MacDonald describes as “the power to recognize this truth of a thing” 
(469) through the distinction between truth and facts. Truth can seem like a 
farce to those whose senses have not been set right by the great reversal. We 
see this instance take place when Irene tells her nurse about her grandmother 
in the attic:
‘I’ve been up a long way to see my very great, huge, old 
grandmother,’ said the princess.  
‘What do you mean by that?’ asked the nurse, who thought she was 
making fun.  
‘I mean that I’ve been a long way up and up to see my GREAT 
grandmother. Ah, nursie, you don’t know what a beautiful mother 
of grandmothers I’ve got upstairs. She is such an old lady, with such 
lovely white hair—as white as my silver cup. Now, when I think of 
it, I think her hair must be silver.’  
‘What nonsense you are talking, princess!’ said the nurse.  
‘I’m not talking nonsense,’ returned Irene, rather offended. (32)
This contrast between the sensible and the nonsensible, the natural and 
supernatural, asserts that the intuition and imagination of those having 
undergone the great reversal are granted a supernatural, epistemological 
approach that goes against the natural or sensible modes of knowing.
This contrast repeatedly becomes apparent throughout the text. When 
the princess rescues Curdie from the mountain, Curdie finds himself at the 
mercy of Irene’s guiding thread, which operates beyond comprehension. 
When Irene asserts that she is being led by a higher power, her grandmother’s 
thread, Curdie replies, “That’s all nonsense. I don’t know what you mean” 
(214). She replies, “Then if you don’t know what I mean, what right have 
you to call it nonsense?” (215). Irene’s admonishment echoes MacDonald’s 
understanding of truth as something that has the power to exist outside of 
our immediate empirical modes of knowing and presents a mode of truth 
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that is seemingly at odds with sense. Irene’s reply undermines the Curdie’s 
conventional modes of navigating the mountain and exposes his implicit 
conceit by insisting that, simply because something lies beyond Curdie’s 
knowledge, does not mean that it cannot exist. The rebellion of the rule of 
sense operates as an anarchical supplanting of privileged modes of thought 
in the same way apophatic theology insists that much of the spiritual must be 
beyond our understanding.6 As a similar form of nonsensical epistemology, 
apophatic theology asserts that spiritual, divine truths are so beyond our 
intelligence that they cannot be expressed in positive terms and, at best, can 
only be described negatively. This approach is more closely associated with 
forms of Christian mysticism as seen in that of Dionysius the Aeropagite, 
Maximus the Confessor, Jokob Boehme, and others. Knowledge is often 
found in the unknowing. Thus, MacDonald writes, “I am no logician. I only 
know when I don’t know a thing . . . wisdom lies in that” (The Flight of the 
Shadow 109). 
Carroll’s Wonderland, for instance, is at once a place and a state of 
mind in which the suspension of rationality is the key to understanding its 
world. For the precocious Alice, endowed with both childlike amazement 
and adult-like common sense, the experience in Wonderland can be frightful 
and frustrating, especially when pitted against such “uncommon nonsense” 
and the anarchical laws of the world (Carroll 81). When the Gryphon orders 
Alice to repeat “‘Tis the voice of the sluggard,” she finds that her own words 
come out as nonsense because her head was “so full of Lobster-Quadrille” 
and, as a result, “she hardly knew what she was saying” (80). The nonsense 
of Wonderland apparently has a disorienting effect upon Alice’s mind. The 
very words she speaks then suddenly become strange. Upon hearing Alice’s 
discombobulated recitation, the Mock Turtle replies, “Well I never heard it 
before, but it sounds uncommon nonsense” (81). 
There are two ways of reading the phrase “uncommon nonsense.” 
If we take into consideration Carroll’s affinity for logical formulas, the 
phrase, simplified through the cancellation of the double negatives, becomes 
“common sense,” which, in a world where nonsense is sense, turns the very 
meaning of sense upon its head. The use of negatives here also echoes the 
long tradition of apophatic theology, which posits that negative statements 
concerning higher laws are inherently more accurate than affirmative or 
cataphatic statements. Under this reading, the cancellation of the double 
negatives does not grant an accurate interpretation of the phrase. Uncommon 
nonsense and common sense are, within context of apophatic discourse, 
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incongruent, since the former is epistemologically superior to the latter. The 
second possible interpretation is that “uncommon nonsense” implies that 
there exists common nonsense, which governs life in Wonderland the same 
way common sense governs Alice’s world. Under this reading, the world of 
Wonderland is a world opposed to the world of rationality as Alice knows 
it. Wonderland is potentially lawlessness, a status of anarchy which grants 
Carroll’s adherence to Novalis’s model of the anarchical Märchen.7 Alice 
finds herself without a law to invoke her agency. Completely irritated, Alice 
“sat down with her face in her hands, wondering if anything would ever 
happen in a natural way again” (81). 
The chaos of lawlessness, however, is requisite in bringing about 
the “great reversal” or the eucatastrophe of Christian theology, which is 
founded upon the existence of other worlds governed by higher, unapparent 
laws.8 Having established the connection between Novalis and Victorian 
nonsense literature, let us examine Novalis’s idea of anarchy as “the natural 
state of nature,” a state which is pre-lapsarian if we contextualize anarchy 
within Novalis’s triadic, cosmological scheme. In his essay “Christenheit 
oder Europa” (“Christendom or Europe”), Novalis outlines his conception 
of history in the following way. First, there exists a primal nature in a state 
of harmony, or golden age. The golden age, depicted as a childlike state 
of innocence, is then disrupted by anarchy, the second state. The state of 
anarchy, writes Novalis, “is the breeding ground of religion” and leads to a 
restorative state of peace greater than what was experienced in the primal 
state of harmony (Schriften III 517). Novalis’s conception of history is 
essential to understanding the role of anarchy in his Märchen model, which 
resembles that of his triadic account of history, and places anarchy as the 
essential towards a higher resolution.
The resolution, for MacDonald, is imparted through the necessary 
and anarchical disruption of common sense, as well as the natural laws of 
the world. In his fairy tale Phantastes, the protagonists’ interaction within 
“Fairy Land” elicits almost immediately this same sense of wonder produced 
by Wonderland. Anodos, MacDonald’s protagonist and narrator, is puzzled 
by the order of Fairy Land and writes: “But it is no use trying to account for 
things in Fairy Land; and one who travels there soon learns to forget the very 
idea of doing so, and takes everything as it comes” (46). The narrator, who 
is writing his account after returning from Fairy Land, recounts with wisdom 
retrospectively garnered from his experience, which caused him to become 
“like a child, who, being in a chronic condition of wonder, is surprised at 
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nothing” (47). Like Alice, MacDonald’s protagonist Anodos ends the story 
with a similar reflection of his experience:
I will end my story with the relation of an incident which befell me 
a few days ago. I had been with my reapers, and, when they ceased 
their work at noon, I had laid down under the shadow of a great, 
ancient beech tree, that stood on the edge of the field. As I lay, with 
my eyes closed, I began to listen to the sound of the leaves overhead. 
At first, they made sweet inarticulate music alone; but, by-and-by, the 
sound seemed to begin to take shape, and to be gradually moulding 
itself into words; till, at last, I seemed able to distinguish these, 
half-dissolved in a little ocean of circumfluent tones: ‘A great good 
is coming—is coming—is coming to thee, Anodos’; and so over and 
over again. I fancied that the sound reminded me of the voice of the 
ancient woman, in the cottage that was four-square. I opened my 
eyes, and, for a moment, almost believed that I saw her face, with its 
many wrinkles and its young eyes, looking at me from between two 
hoary branches of the beech over-head. (319)
Anarchy plays a similar role in the resolution in Carroll’s Alice 
in Wonderland. Alice’s exasperation throughout the novel has been 
culminating towards the dissolution of the anarchy of Wonderland in the 
last chapter, in which Alice finally proclaims to the Queen of Hearts “Stuff 
and nonsense!” and “You’re nothing but a pack of cards!” (95). The result 
is the disenchantment of the entire dream and dissolution of the chaos. 
What appears to have been a frustratingly bad dream for Alice, suddenly 
becomes beautiful through the deeper harmony acquired by retrospective 
understanding, or in theological terms, something akin to restoration. Alice 
reflects upon “what a wonderful dream it had been” and, by relating the 
dream to her sister, imparts to her the sense of wonder which changes “dull 
reality” into magic (96). Left alone on the bank, “watching the sun setting,” 
Alice’s sister begins to dream about Alice and her adventures in Wonderland, 
and she imagines the world around her coming alive with the characters of 
Wonderland: 
The White Rabbit hurried by—the frightened Mouse splashed his 
way through the neighboring pool—she could hear the rattle of the 
teacups as the March Hare and his friends shared their never-ending 
meal, and the shrill voice of the Queen ordering off her unfortunate 
gusts to execution—once more the pig-baby was sneezing on the 
Duchess’s knee while plates and dishes crashed around it—once 
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more the shriek of the Gryphon, the squeaking of the Lizzard’s slate-
pencil, and the choking of the suppressed guinea-pigs, filled the air, 
mixed up with the distant sob of the miserable Mock Turtle. (96)
Thus, the uncomfortable and frustrating experience of nonsense curiously 
brings about a positive outlook upon the real world to which Alice returns. 
Retrospectively, the experience of the dream is positive, even edifying, not 
only for Alice, whom her sister suspects will become an adult story-teller, but 
also for those who listen to her stories as well. 
These two endings portray magical worlds unified after undergoing 
the turmoil of chaos and anarchy through the disrupting use of nonsense and 
convey the eucatastrophic resolution. Nonsense, or the effects produced by 
an encounter and a forced engagement with it, brings about illumination, 
or as Strachey puts it, brings “out a new and deeper harmony of life” (515). 
In the same way that Novalis’s Märchen world is inverted or opposed to 
the world of truth (the word used by Novalis is entgegengesetzt, meaning 
reversed or opposed), Christian theology, in opposition to purely empiricist 
or generally secular modes of knowing, is governed by alternative laws, 
which appear chaotic and anarchical when juxtaposed or imposed upon 
the “rational” mind. “Nonsense,” writes Gabelman, “does not necessarily 
make a statement redundant or untrue, but calls for a different type of 
logic” (196). The same inversion or opposition between governing laws 
and epistemological approaches is essential to the nonsensical realities of 
MacDonald’s and Carroll’s texts. However, when considering the theology of 
Victorian children’s authors such as MacDonald and Carroll, it is imperative 
to examine their debt to Romanticism, especially the movement’s theological 
poets such as Coleridge and Novalis, to whom MacDonald and Carroll 
gravitated and read specifically because of their poetic—and sometimes 
unorthodox—theology. 
Endnotes
1. In addition to Gabelman’s research, others have also taken a recent 
scholarly interest in nonsense literature. See Elizabeth Sewell’s Field of 
Nonsense. 1952. (Dalkey Archive Press, 2015); and Michael Holquist’s 
“What Is a Boojum? Nonsense and Modernism” (Yale French Studies, 
no. 43, 1969, pp. 145-164). Another study worthy of note is Daniel 
Gabelman's George MacDonald: Divine Carelessness and Fairytale 
Levity (Baylor UP, 2013), which examines nonsense as theological and 
literary “playfulness.”
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2. Tolkien coined the word in his essay “On Fairy-Stories.” He elaborated 
on his concept of eucatastrophe in the following letter: “I coined the 
word ‘eucatastrophe’: the sudden happy turn in a story which pierces you 
with a joy that brings tears (which I argued it is the highest function of 
fairy-stories to produce). And I was there led to the view that it produces 
its peculiar effect because it is a sudden glimpse of Truth, your whole 
nature chained in material cause and effect, the chain of death, feels a 
sudden relief as if a major limb out of joint had suddenly snapped back. It 
perceives—if the story has literary ‘truth’ on the second plane . . . —that 
this is indeed how things really do work in the Great World for which 
our nature is made. And I concluded by saying that the Resurrection was 
the greatest ‘eucatastrophe’ possible in the greatest Fairy Story—and 
produces that essential emotion: Christian joy which produces tears 
because it is qualitatively so like sorrow, because it comes from those 
places where Joy and Sorrow are at one, reconciled, as selfishness and 
altruism are lost in Love.” See The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien, Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt (2014).
3. Most recently, Hans Urs von Balthasar’s has stated that theology should 
abandon the “extra-theological categories of worldly philosophical 
aesthetics” for a “theory of beauty from the data of revelation itself.” In 
keeping with the rich tradition of theological aesthetics that began with 
the writings of the early Christian Church, Balthasar argues that beauty 
must be understood as a means of understanding God, not as a thing to be 
apprehended. See von Balthasar’s A Theological Aesthetics, eds. Joseph 
Fessio and John Riches, trans. Erasmo Leivia-Merikakis, vol. 1, Seeing 
the Form (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993, 3).
4. See, for example, St. Augustine’s Confessions chap.  XXVII: “I sought 
Thee outside and . . . fell upon those lovely things that Thou hast made. 
Thou were with me and 1 was not with Thee. I was kept from Thee by 
those things, yet had they not been in Thee, they would not have been 
at all.” C.S. Lewis, concerning the desire for an unattainable beauty, 
similarly draws from a long tradition of theological aesthetics when he 
writes: “The books or the music in which we thought the beauty was 
located will betray us if we trust to them; it was not in them, it only came 
through them, and what came through them was longing. These things—
the beauty, the memory of our own past—are good images of what we 
really desire; but if they are mistaken for the thing itself they turn into 
dumb idols, breaking the hearts of their worshippers. For they are not the 
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thing itself; they are only the scent of a flower we have not found, the 
echo of a tune we have not heard, news from a country we have never yet 
visited.” See Lewis’s “The Weight of Glory,” first preached in University 
Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Oxford, on June 8, 1941, and published in 
Theology 43 (November 1941): 263-74.
5. See Polhemus’s “Play, Nonsense, and Games,” in Alice and Wonderland, 
Norton Critical Edition, 370.
6. Even within the deconstructionism of Jacques Derrida, there is a hint of 
that which cannot be cataphatically named. Derrida’s deconstructionism 
is, essentially, attacking the logic of identity (put forth by Aristotle), 
which claims that all knowledge can be divided into categories. See, for 
example Derrida’s essay “How To Avoid Speaking: Denials.”
7. I do not presently argue that Carroll is in conscious or explicit 
conversation with the German Romantic discourse of the Märchen. 
Though Carroll would have likely been familiar with the writings of 
Novalis through MacDonald, it is uncertain, even perhaps unlikely, that 
Carroll has Novalis’s ideal Märchen in mind when composing the Alice 
stories. For the purposes of my argument, I merely seek to examine how 
Novalis’s necessitation of anarchy for the fairy tale is often demonstrated 
and fulfilled in Carroll’s text. 
8. In The Gospel of John (18:36), for instance, Christ tells Pontius Pilot 
“My kingdom is not of this world.”
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